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ARGUMENT
The trial court erred when it granted the Griffms' motion for summary judgment
and found that the Griffins had an easement over a private lane by virtue of a subdivision
plat. Under the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure, a court may not grant summary judgment
unless the moving party establishes "[1] that there is no genuine issue as to any material
fact and [2] that the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law." Utah R.
Civ. P. 56(c) (emphasis added); see also Oak Lane Homeowners Ass'n v. Griffin. 2006
UT App 465, TJ6, 153 P.3d 740. When a court addresses a motion for summary judgment,
it "must evaluate all the evidence and all reasonable inferences fairly drawn from the
evidence in a light most favorable to the party opposing summary judgment." Bowen v.
Riverton City, 656 P.2d 434, 436 (Utah 1982).
This Court reviews a trial court's grant of summary judgment de novo, Poteet v.
White, 2006 UT 63, *{ 7, 147 P.3d 439, and should therefore reverse the trial court's
decision because the Griffins were not and are not entitled to judgment as a matter of law.
Under Utah law, the Griffins have no interest in or easement over Oak Lane. Further, a
material issue of fact exists as to the ownership of Oak Lane.
I.

UNDER UTAH LAW, THE GRIFFINS DO NOT HAVE AN INTEREST IN
OR EASEMENT OVER OAK LANE.
A.

Under Utah Law, The Griffins Have No Ownership Interest In Oak
Lane.

The Griffins can point to no relevant Utah law that provides them an interest in
Oak Lane. Even the 'learned treatises" cited by the Griffins do not cite any Utah case

1

law or statutory law. The one Utah case cited by the Griffins is easily distinguished from
the facts of the case before this Court.l In Carrier v. Lindquist, two adjacent property
owners each had land abutting a public alley. 2001 UT 105,ffif4-5, 37 P.3d 1112. One
of the property owners blocked the other's access to the alley. Id. at ^| 6. The Utah
Supreme Court held that the defendants could not block the plaintiffs' access to the alley
because "landowners whose property abuts public streets, alleys, and public ways that
appear on a plat map are entitled to a private easement over those public ways." Id. at *jj
12.
This case is clearly distinct from Carrier v. Lindquist because, rather than a public
alley, the dispute revolves around a private street. The initial purchasers of the Oak Hills
subdivision specifically declined to dedicate Oak Lane to public use. Those initial
owners therefore expressly retained ownership of Oak Lane by virtue of the plat. It is
clear that the original owners of Oak Lane did not simply retain an easement over Oak
Lane, but rather actually owned, as tenants in common, the land.
In Utah, the Statute of Frauds clearly states that a transfer of real property must be
in writing:
No estate or interest in real property, other than leases for a term not
exceeding one year, nor any trust or power over or concerning real property
or in any manner relating thereto, shall be created, granted, assigned,
surrendered or declared otherwise than by act or operation of law, or by
deed or conveyance in writing subscribed by the party creating, granting,
1

The rest of the treatises and cases from other states cited by the Griffins in their brief are
irrelevant because they are not binding authority on this Court and distinguishable
because of the way the original owners of Oak Lane modified the plat and retained
ownership of Oak Lane.
2

assigning, surrendering or declaring the same, or by his lawful agent
thereunto authorized by writing.
Utah Code Ann. § 25-5-1 (2008). Therefore, any subsequent ownership of Oak Lane
would have to be expressly transferred, in writing, by those original owners. And such a
transfer did occur. On September 11, 2003, the seven original owners of Oak Lane
transferred their interests in Oak Lane via quitclaim deed to the Association. (R. 535-39.)
The subsequent owners of Lot 2, the Watkins, testified that they understood that
Oak Lane was a private road and used it only with permission. (R. 131-139.) It is
undisputed that no language in the Griffins' deed grants them an express ownership
interest in or easement over Oak Lane. They were therefore not entitled to judgment as a
matter of law, and this Court should reverse the trial court's summary judgment.
B.

Under Utah Law, The Griffins Do Not Have An Express Easement
Over Oak Lane.

The Griffins argue that an easement by plat is simply an express easement.
However, the Griffins do not meet the elements required under Utah law for an express
easement.
Under Utah law, an express easement is "expressly created between two parties in
a land transaction or conveyance by an express grant or an express reservation." Potter v.
Chadaz, 1999 UT App 95, ^f 9, 977 P.2d 533.. There are no specific requirements for the
creation of an express easement, so Utah courts look to the "intent of the parties to an
agreement purportedly transferring real property . . . . Words that clearly show intention
to grant an easement are sufficient, provided the language is certain and definite in its
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term."' Id. (quoting Warburton v. Virginia Beach Fed. Sav. & Loan Ass 'n, 899 P.2d 779,
781-82 (Utah Ct. App. 1995)). Additionally, creation of an express easement requires the
mutual assent of the parties, as well as consideration. Id.
In this case, there is indisputably no indication that any owner of Lot 2 ever
transferred or conveyed an express easement to the Griffins, written or otherwise. In fact,
all the evidence indicates the contrary. The Griffins5 deed not does reference Oak Lane at
all. (R. 132, 139.) The house on Lot 2 is not accessible via Oak Lane. And, most
importantly, the intent of all parties involved indicates no intention of creating an express
easement. The original owners expressly delineated the public dedication of Oak Lane in
the plat and took over ownership of the lane. (R. 532.) Lot 2's previous owners
acknowledge that they used Oak Lane with permission of the original owners, not
because they had any kind of an easement on the road, (R. 131-139), and the original
owners deeded Oak Lane to the Association. (R. 535-39.) The Griffins cannot point to
any document, fact, or circumstance indicating they have an express easement over Oak
Lane.
Therefore, the Griffins do not have an express easement over or ownership interest
in Oak Lane and were not entitled to judgment as a matter of law.
II.

THE NATURE OF THE OWNERSHIP OF OAK LANE CONSTITUTES A
MATERIAL ISSUE OF FACT.
Though there are several disputed issues of material fact in this case, two of the

most important and material disputes are with respect to the nature of the ownership of
Oak Lane and the nature and extent of the Griffins' use of Oak Lane.
4

There is clearly a dispute as to the ownership of Oak Lane. The Association
claims ownership of Oak Lane by virtue of a quitclaim deed from the original owners of
Oak Lane. (R. 535-39.) As illustrated through the Griffins' brief, they, on the other hand,
claim that Oak Lane is owned by the current owners of the subdivision by virtue of the
plat and that the quitclaim deed is ineffective to convey title of Oak Lane to the
Association. This fundamental dispute is both a factual and legal question at issue in this
case that should have precluded summary judgment.
There is also a clear dispute as to the Griffin's use of Oak Lane. The Association
claims that the Griffins' use has not been for access but rather for sporadic storage. (R.
306.) The Griffins, on the other hand, claim that they used Oak Lane to access their
property on a daily basis. (R. 226.) Such a dispute is material in that the Griffins do not
need to use Oak Lane to access their property or even for the enjoyment and use of their
property. The Griffins are simply trespassing on property that they do not own or have an
easement over and that they have no interest in helping to maintain. This material dispute
is a factual question at issue in this case that should have precluded summary judgment.
In light of the above disputed facts, the trial court erred in granting summary
judgment, and this Court should reverse and remand for a trial.

5

CONCLUSION
Therefore, in light of the foregoing, this Court should reverse the trial court's grant
of summary judgment in the Griffins' favor and remand this case back to the trial court
for a trial.
RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED this 7th day of January 2009.
HILL, JOHNSON & SCHMUTZ, LC

StejMienjQuesenberry
Jessica Griffin Anderson
Attorneys for Plaintiff/Appellant
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